By خالد القاضي on Wednesday, 18 June 2025
Category: مدونات عربية

Reflections on the Muslim Brotherhood’s Statement Regarding the Iran–Israel Conflict

The orientation of social groups is shaped by their interests, the extent of their political influence as derived from their positions, the security of their members and movements, and the networks they are able to build on the ground. This is supported by sociological research; for instance, Charles Tilly affirms that political movements make choices based on calculations of power and interest (p. 88, Tilly, Social Movements, 2004).

This analytical framework clearly applies to the Muslim Brotherhood as well. However, in addition to pragmatic considerations, the group also draws upon Islamic legal and ethical principles that guide its jurisprudential and political interpretations—principles that aim to balance public benefit and harm.

Despite this, there are occasions where such principles appear to be sidelined, resulting in statements that are fragmented, misrepresentative, or lacking in coherence. This description applies to two recent statements attributed to factions within the group—one issued by the so-called "Change Current" and published in Al-Quds Al-Arabi as part of a journalistic investigation, and the other published on the Brotherhood's official website. Both texts address the Israel-Iran conflict but do so in a manner that lacks academic rigor, realism, and sound legal reasoning.

It is important to reference the disclaimer, even if its position has remained consistent since the organizational split, which notes:

"Statements by the Change Current do not necessarily reflect the position of the parent organization; rather, they are indicative of internal divisions that require resolution."

In truth, both statements require careful reconsideration.

A critical review of both statements can be summarized in six key observations.

 1. A Historical Inconsistency

Both statements describe Iran as an "Islamic state"—a characterization that overlooks critical historical and political complexities. They fail to acknowledge Iran's longstanding record of suppressing Sunni communities, including the prohibition on building Sunni mosques in Tehran, despite the presence of approximately two million Sunnis (p. 67, Afshari, Human Rights in Iran, 2001).

Additionally, both statements omit reference to the documented cooperation between Iranian and American forces following the 2003 invasion of Iraq in dismantling the former regime (p. 193, Nasr, The Shia Revival, 2006). More concerning is the failure to mention the documented human rights violations targeting Palestinian refugees in Iraq, as reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in collaboration with the Norwegian Refugee Council (UNHCR, Palestinians in Iraq: A Needs Assessment, 2008).

This inconsistency is further illustrated by a 2009 statement from the former General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mahdi Akef, who remarked:

"We reject Iranian intervention in Iraq just as we reject the Zionist occupation."

Such contradictions raise legitimate questions: What kind of Islamic state is being referenced? And to which version of Islam are they referring? 

2. Double Standards in Condemning Expansion: Contradictory Criteria

While both statements strongly condemned Israeli expansion, they remained silent regarding Iran's growing influence and territorial entrenchment in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—particularly through militia groups such as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which have been associated with widespread infrastructure damage.

The Iraqi Commission of Inquiry documented in its 2021 final report (Chapter 4) that many security decisions in areas liberated from ISIS were made with the approval of Iranian advisors. Furthermore, a 2020 study by MIT found that up to 40% of Iraq's infrastructure damage was attributable to conflicts involving Iranian-backed militias. This is in addition to the demographic displacement and sectarian cleansing that impacted millions of Sunni civilians in these regions.

3. Contradictory Messaging on Egypt: Selective Concern

Both statements offered advice to the Egyptian government, alternating between warnings and expressions of concern. At times, Egypt is listed among the victims of regional conflict, while at other times, the tone shifts toward a cautious admiration, particularly evident in the Change Current's statement, which appears to express concern for the Egyptian military.

Such framing, however, overlooks critical facts—namely, the documented cooperation between Egypt and Israel in enforcing the blockade on Gaza. Analyst Ehud Ya'ari described this coordination as "beyond all expectations" (Ya'ari, Egypt-Israel Relations: Beyond the Veil, Foreign Affairs, 2017). Furthermore, Amnesty International reported that Egypt blocked humanitarian aid convoys to Gaza in 2022 (Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians, p. 33, Amnesty International, 2022).

In this context, the Change Current's statement, which offers cautionary advice to the Egyptian army regarding potential threats from Israel, appears disconnected from reality. One must ask: When, exactly, was Israel ever under threat from the Egyptian military? Without the Gaza blockade and the complicity of regional actors, including the Egyptian government, the current humanitarian crisis would not have reached such depths.

4. Jeopardizing Strategic Alliances: Academic Warnings

Both statements appear disconnected from the organizational interests of the group, which currently faces internal fragmentation and legal challenges to its presence in both Western and Arab host countries. From a pragmatic standpoint, it would have been more appropriate for the group to remain silent on a conflict in which it holds neither direct stake nor influence. Moving from silence to open support and condolences may risk increasing legal scrutiny and political pressure, potentially criminalizing not only the organization's activities in the West but also its very ideological presence. This shift could also sever vital support networks involved in advocating for detainees imprisoned by the Egyptian government and in efforts to reduce both domestic and international pressure.

Researcher Olivier Roy cautioned against such strategic miscalculations, emphasizing the vulnerability of exiled Islamist networks when they issue "ill-considered declarations that undo alliances carefully built over years" (p. 145, Roy, Globalized Islam, 2004). Similarly, a 2018 report by the European Parliament (Changing Attitudes of European Governments Toward Islamist Activists) highlighted that a significant number of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated activists in Europe lost government support following pro-Iran statements.

In the end, such positions risk alienating all parties involved: Iran will not offer them lasting approval, Western governments may impose restrictions, and the Egyptian regime remains firmly opposed to their return.

5. Overlooking Legal-Religious Caution: A Foundational Risk

Both statements neglect a fundamental principle widely accepted in traditional jurisprudence: verifying facts before taking public positions. Even a basic reading of relevant Prophetic traditions would counsel prudence. For example, the narration:

"You will make peace with the Romans in a secure truce…"
(Reported by Ahmad, Hadith 18449, with a sound chain)

—has often been interpreted by scholars as a reference to potential future cooperation with Western nations in broader strategic contexts. Such interpretations suggest that collaboration or non-confrontation with Western powers, particularly in pursuit of educational, social, or humanitarian goals, may serve long-term interests—even if these benefits are not immediately visible. In this light, maintaining neutrality in conflicts between opposing regional powers, especially when both sides bear responsibility for civilian harm, would have been the wiser course.

Is it truly wise to overlook the documented historical and ongoing violations attributed to Iran in various regional contexts?

As Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi states in Fiqh al-Awlawiyyat (p. 115):

"It is not acceptable to align with an oppressor against a fellow Muslim, even under the pretense of resisting colonialism."
 6. Strategic Consequences of Political Endorsements

The Brookings Institution cautions that:

"Support for Iran by political movements risks turning them into criminalized entities in the West."
(Political Islam in the West: Integration Challenges, 2023, p. 18).

Despite their intent, neither of the two statements managed to break the triad of isolation: Iran will not endorse them, Western governments remain cautious, and the Egyptian regime continues its opposition.

According to a 2023 report by the Gulf Research Center, statements in favor of Iran have directly contributed to the suspension of funding for a significant number of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated charitable organizations, as well as the cancellation of 17 academic cooperation agreements with Gulf universities. Similarly, the Washington Institute (2022) warned that such public declarations could be used as supporting evidence in legal cases related to "material support for designated terrorist organizations," as outlined in Article 13 of European counterterrorism laws.

These developments demand serious reflection. Activists and spokespersons must recognize the risks and prepare for increasing scrutiny. The coming phase will likely present even greater challenges—ones that require careful, informed decision-making. A prudent example can be seen in the statement issued by the Association of Muslim Scholars, which took a balanced stance by warning against the actions of both regional actors after thoroughly reviewing the impact of their policies on Sunni communities.

It is imperative to avoid paying the price for others' strategic miscalculations. As Charles Tilly observed:

"Movements that act against their own interests eventually pay a heavy price."
(p. 203, Tilly, Social Movements, 2004).

Historical precedents support this view—such as factions in Syria that once aligned themselves with Iran, only to be abandoned once their short-term role had expired. A repeat of such misjudgment may lead to even harsher consequences for those who fail to heed the lessons of the past.

As the Algerian thinker Malek Bennabi wisely stated in The Conditions of the Renaissance:

"The gravest loss any movement can suffer is the loss of intellectual discipline."

References

  1. Afshari, R. (2001). Human Rights in Iran. University of Pennsylvania Press.
  2. Nasr, V. (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. W.W. Norton & Company.
  3. UNHCR & Norwegian Refugee Council. (2008). Palestinians in Iraq: A Needs Assessment.
  4. Kechichian, J.A. (2017). Iran's Strategic Penetration in the Arab World. Palgrave Macmillan.
  5. Carnegie Endowment. (2023). Iran's Dominance in Iraq: Scenarios for the Future.
  6. Ya'ari, E. (2017). Egypt-Israel Relations: Beyond the Veil. Foreign Affairs.
  7. Amnesty International. (2022). Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians.
  8. Roy, O. (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma. Columbia University Press.
  9. Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements, 1768–2004. Paradigm Publishers.
  10. Brookings Institution. (2023). Political Islam in the West: Integration Challenges.
  11. BBC News. (2013). Iran-Egypt Ties: A History of Distrust.
  12. European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies. (2018). Changing Attitudes of European Governments Toward Islamist Activists.
  13. Iraqi Commission of Inquiry. (2021). Final Report. Baghdad.
  14. MIT University. (2020). Damage to Infrastructure in Iraq due to Militia Conflicts. MIT Press.
  15. Gulf Research Center. (2023). The Political Consequences of Pro-Iranian Statements on Charities and Educational Agreements. Dubai.
  16. The Washington Institute. (2022). Legal Risks for Islamist Groups in Europe under Anti-terrorism Legislation.
  17. International Crisis Group (ICG). (2023). Iran's Networks of Influence in Iraq. Brussels.
  18. MEMRI. (2022). Iranian Funding for Syrian Factions: Documents and Analysis. Washington DC.
  19. RAND Corporation. (2024). Costs of Political Islamists' Alliances: A Mathematical Modeling Study. Santa Monica, CA.
  20. Oxford University. (2023). Sunni-Shia Geopolitics in Exile Movements: Interviews with Brotherhood Leaders.
  21. Al-Qaradawi, Y. (2008). Fiqh al-Awlawiyyat [The Jurisprudence of Priorities]. Cairo: Dar Al-Fikr.
  22. Asharq Al-Awsat. (2022). Change Current Statements Do Not Represent the Official Position of the Group.
  23. Anadolu Agency. (2021). Statement by Brotherhood Spokesman Talaat Fahmi Denying Representation by Alternate Front.
  24. Akef, M. (2009). Press Interview with BBC on Iranian Intervention in Iraq.