In a fast-paced world, media discourse increasingly permeates the formation of public awareness. However, does this discourse adhere to facts and established scientific principles?
This article sheds light on a vital issue concerning the nature of scientific and intellectual shallowing prevalent in the security and military domains. This trend actively contributes to the trivialization of security and military awareness. Superficial media commentary plays a central role in dumbing down the public mindset and corrupting the understanding of entire generations by ignoring long-established fundamentals and presenting them as "novel discoveries" exclusive to certain entities.
A critical issue widely circulated today—and heavily fueled by specific agendas belonging to particular entities—is the complete disregard for scientific axioms within security and military studies in mainstream media. This deliberate omission trivializes public thinking and reduces security and military awareness. To illustrate this phenomenon clearly, specific case studies warrant examination.
1. THE ABSENCE OF SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS CONTRIBUTES TO TRIVIALISING PUBLIC AWARENESS
Numerous social media platforms and news outlets recently generated significant noise regarding reports that the Turkish National Intelligence Academy meticulously analyzed the Iranian–American–Israeli conflict, extracting key operational lessons in preparation for potential military confrontations with Israel [1].
In reality, framing this news in such a manner reflects either sheer ignorance on the writer's part or a deliberate attempt to mislead readers. According to long-standing military and security traditions observed across all contemporary major and middle-power institutions, monitoring any military conflict globally, collecting comprehensive intelligence on it, studying its dynamics, and extracting operational lessons are fundamental duties. Furthermore, states routinely implement concrete practical measures internally based on these findings [2].
This imperative becomes even more pronounced when the combatant parties are geographically proximate to the state or when there is a realistic probability of entering into a conflict with any of the involved parties.
It is no secret that regional states possessing established military and security infrastructure have consistently monitored all regional conflicts. Their relevant agencies have rigorously studied these wars to extract strategic and tactical lessons. Notable historical examples include the monitoring and systematic study of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) [3], the Gulf War for the Liberation of Kuwait (1991) [4], and the US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) [5] and Iraq (2003) [6], alongside Israel's various military campaigns and regional aggressions.
Moreover, extensive scholarly research has been authored and published on these conflicts, including authoritative studies by Major General Amin Howeidi [7], Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala [8], and Prince Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud [9], among others.
Regarding the surveillance of foreign military armaments and training—specifically concerning armed forces that a nation might be compelled to fight against or that pose a potential threat of aggression—the basic rule of security and defense planning dictates continuous monitoring of their exercises, weapons systems, and operational competencies. These elements must subsequently undergo thorough analysis and evaluation.
Following this, practical measures are executed to maintain strategic superiority. These include military adjustments, such as specialized training regimens or the procurement of advanced defense hardware, as well as necessary civilian adjustments in economic planning, civil defense, infrastructure resilience, international diplomacy, and internal public policy.
To claim that only a single state in the entire world engages in these basic practices is an assertion born of profound ignorance and absurdity.
Indeed, many of Iran's defensive postures that resisted American and Israeli offensive operations during 2025 and 2026 were directly established upon lessons derived from the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 1991 and 2003 [10]. This reflects standard operational procedure for security and military management in all major and middle-power states.
All of this contrasts sharply with the sensationalist commentary surrounding the report by the Turkish National Intelligence Academy, which falsely implied that no entity in the world—or within the Middle East—monitored or analyzed the Iranian–American–Israeli conflict except Turkey.
The fundamentals of objective scientific analysis within security and military sciences allow us to state unequivocally that nations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia undoubtedly monitored and analyzed the conflict in detail, taking practical military, political, and civil measures as a result, even if such steps were not publicly announced [11].
2. MISLEADING INTELLIGENCE CLAIMS THAT DUMB DOWN SECURITY AND MILITARY LITERACY
Another prevalent trend across mainstream and social media is the redundant chatter surrounding Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), framing them as revolutionary new fields that require urgent attention.
This wave of commentary erupted following public statements by Hakan Fidan, Turkey's current Minister of Foreign Affairs and former head of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), regarding the future significance of Signals Intelligence [12].
Media commentators seized upon Fidan's remarks, echoing slogans and unfounded claims about SIGINT and OSINT as though they represented novel breakthroughs previously unknown or unpracticed. This ignores the historical fact that Signals Intelligence has been systematically applied since at least the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 [13] and has remained a core pillar for intelligence services in all major and middle-power states ever since.
Similarly, Open-Source Intelligence has been utilized by intelligence institutions since the dawn of history. The underlying principle has remained constant; only the medium of open sources evolves over time.
OSINT originated from ordinary human speech, public addresses, poetry, humor, and rumors in ancient and medieval eras, evolving into newspapers, news agencies, radio, and television in the modern era, and expanding today to encompass internet data and commercial satellite imagery [14].
3. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF "INFLUENCERS" IN CORRUPTING THE SECURITY MINDSET OF EMERGING GENERATIONS
These elementary security principles have been co-opted by social media "influencers" and superficial commentators, who package them in sensationalized formats to maximize viewership. This behavior reflects not only personal ignorance and opportunism, but also directly contributes to dumbing down and corrupting the intellectual awareness of young readers who build their knowledge on intentional, shallow rhetoric.
Generations raised on such discourse will fail to comprehend how state intelligence, security, and defense apparatuses actually operate. They are led to believe that SIGINT, OSINT, or the systematic analysis of ongoing conflicts for tactical and strategic lessons are secondary or novel endeavors practiced exclusively by select actors, rather than standard operational protocols established for centuries.
This dynamic not only degrades public literacy regarding defense matters, but ultimately fosters a culture of complacency and ad-hoc decision-making, discouraging structured foresight, strategic planning, and advance preparation.
This constitutes a disservice by those masquerading as defense experts, strategic analysts, or prominent social media commentators.
Ultimately, exposing this superficial treatment of military affairs in the media is essential to protecting public discourse from systemic degradation. Distinguishing between foundational principles and technical modernisations remains the only pathway toward cultivating genuine strategic awareness and resisting the sensationalism spread by superficial commentary.
4. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE LITERACY
Question 1: What is the historical origin of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and is it a modern discovery?
Signals Intelligence is not a recent discovery. Its formal military application dates back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. It has been a standard operational discipline utilized by major and middle-power intelligence agencies worldwide for over a century [13].
Question 2: What defines Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and how has it evolved?
OSINT refers to the systematic collection and analysis of publicly accessible information. Historically, it relied on public speeches, literature, and news publications. Modern OSINT incorporates digital communications, online databases, and commercial satellite imagery, representing an evolution of tools rather than a new discipline [14].
Question 3: How do online commentators' impact public military and security awareness?
Sensationalized reporting by commentators often presents routine intelligence practices as groundbreaking developments. This oversimplification misleads the public regarding how state defense apparatus's function, eroding strategic literacy and encouraging a superficial understanding of national security management.
REFERENCES
[1] MİT Academy (National Intelligence Academy of Türkiye). Official Academic Research and Publications.
https://www.mit.gov.tr
[2] Lowenthal, M. M. (2019). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (8th ed.). CQ Press / SAGE Publications.
https://cqpress.sagepub.com
[3] Cordesman, A. H., & Wagner, A. R. (1990). The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War. Westview Press.
https://www.csis.org
[4] United States Department of Defense (1992). Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: Title V Report.
https://www.esd.whs.mil
[5] Barfield, T. (2010). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton University Press.
https://press.princeton.edu
[6] Ricks, T. E. (2006). Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Penguin Press.
https://www.penguin.randomhouse.com
[7] Howeidi, A. (1993). 50 Years of Storms: Memories and Testimonies. Dar Al-Shorouk (Cairo).
https://www.shorouk.com
[8] Abu Ghazala, A. H. (1998). The Gulf War and the Future of Strategic Balance. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
https://acpss.ahram.org.eg
[9] Khalid bin Sultan, Prince (1995). Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander. HarperCollins.
https://www.harpercollins.com
[10] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2024). The Military Balance 2024. Routledge.
https://www.iiss.org
[11] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2024). SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press.
https://www.sipri.org
[12] Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023). Official Speeches and Press Releases of Minister Hakan Fidan.
https://www.mfa.gov.tr
[13] Ferris, J. (2005). Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays. Routledge.
https://www.routledge.com
[14] Mercado, S. C. (2004). "Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age". Studies in Intelligence, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 48(3).
Source
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