Syrian Media in Sweida Systematic Failure and Missed Opportunities

In an era where narratives clash before bullets are fired, and victories are sometimes decided before the first shot, media has emerged as one of the foremost instruments of both soft and hard power warfare. Today, it represents the symbolic "fiery prelude" with which global powers launch their political and military campaigns. Armies alone no longer hold the monopoly on imposing legitimacy; it is the media that crafts, conveys, defends, or dismantles it. Consequently, states understand that winning the battle of narratives often precedes, and sometimes determines, success on the ground, as winning public opinion can equate to winning the entire conflict.

Major powers grasped this truth early on, establishing media ministries parallel to their militaries, deploying satellites, research centers, and lobbying institutions to promote their narratives and shape the "enemy image" to suit their interests.

Media has become an inseparable element of "Hybrid Warfare," a strategy employed to weaken an opponent's internal front and manipulate morale through distortion and misinformation. This approach blends conventional military operations with psychological, informational, and economic tools.

This awareness is not merely modern; the Islamic tradition historically recognized the centrality of media in warfare and legitimacy. Imam Bukhari records the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ instructing Hassan ibn Thabit:

"Attack them — or taunt them — and Gabriel is with you."

Hassan thus became a kind of official spokesperson for the early Islamic state, countering the psychological and metaphorical warfare waged by Quraysh.

Despite the betrayal by Abdullah ibn Ubayy ibn Salul, leader of the hypocrites, the Prophet ﷺ refrained from ordering his execution, fearing the propaganda backlash that might claim: "Muhammad kills his own companions" (Muslim). This reflects an early awareness of how narrative shapes international and domestic public opinion, as well as the cohesion of the internal front.

Similarly, the Qur'an commands careful verification of information:

"O you who believe, if a wicked person comes to you with news, verify it." [Al-Hujurat: 6]

This foundational principle combats rumors and psychological warfare—phenomena that can cause more damage than cannon fire. The Prophet ﷺ also warned:

"It is enough falsehood for a man to relate everything he hears." (Muslim)

A caution against the automatic replication of narratives without verification—a plague contemporary regimes suffer amid orchestrated media campaigns that recycle falsehoods until they become accepted truths.

The Prophet ﷺ also emphasized that psychological warfare alone is a decisive weapon, as recorded in Sahih al-Bukhari:

"I was granted victory through terror for a distance of one month."

In today's terms, this equates to supremacy in crafting the "state's prestige" and the dominance of the official narrative.

This study is grounded in a foundational premise: media — both in its tangible and symbolic dimensions — is not merely a subordinate to war but an active partner in it. Failure of the media to fulfill its role does not just mean losing the propaganda battle; it entails losing legitimacy, undermining sovereignty, and eroding state institutions.

First: Media as a Tool of War… So How Did the Regime Hand Over the Narrative to Its Opponents?

Since 2011, as the Syrian conflict shifted from protests to a multifaceted armed confrontation, official Syrian media transformed into a bureaucratic propaganda apparatus—incapable of anticipating events or guiding public opinion, and even unable to keep pace with separatist and international counter-narratives.

Specifically, during the Sweida crisis (2023–2025), the government faced one of its most complex challenges: the emergence of a coherent separatist discourse, backed by popular support and regional, including Israeli, patronage, deeply undermining the state's unity and legitimacy.

Despite this existential threat, official media remained confined to generalized statements and skeletal news coverage, lacking professionalism, courage, and a sound legal and international framework.

Second: Media Failures in Leveraging Legal Instruments

One of the most glaring failures of official media was its inability to utilize national and international legal texts to condemn the separatist movement in Sweida.

While the Syrian Penal Code (Articles 275 and 285) clearly criminalizes bearing arms, soliciting foreign intervention, and displaying unauthorized flags, the media failed to employ these legal tools to expose rebellion leaders to the public and the world, settling instead for timid news reports.

No awareness campaigns regarding these legal penalties were broadcast on television, nor were there dedicated talk shows featuring judges and legal experts to clarify the legal status, even as the opponents manipulated public opinion by portraying themselves as victims of "oppression" rather than partners in an armed revolt.

Worse still, the government did not request the judiciary to issue arrest warrants or formal red notices against rebellion leaders, nor did it submit documented files to Interpol or international organizations.

This legal void granted separatists extensive propaganda cover, deprived the state of sovereign or international backing for its security operations, and weakened its position even among its allies.

Third: Shortcomings in Managing Psychological and Propaganda Warfare

In the Sweida dossier, separatist factions and their leaders—such as Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri—relied heavily on a victimhood narrative, exploiting religion and sectarian identity to craft a new symbolic identity for the region. They benefited from support by local pages and foreign media outlets, including Israeli and Western platforms.

Official media failed to grasp the severity of "Hybrid Warfare," where propaganda, psychological operations, and regional pressures converge. There was a complete absence of proactive counter-narratives, and no media programs were produced to expose connections between some factions and Israel or their involvement in drug trafficking, including Captagon.

The screen lacked any genuine courage to confront falsehoods through investigative reports and documented evidence. Instead, official responses were limited to brief news bulletins barely noted by the elite, let alone the general public.

The media could have countered with a series of visual investigations on issues such as:

• Funding of factions through the drug trade, as documented by Reuters and The Guardian (2022–2023).
• Cooperation between some Sweida leaders and Israeli officers, reported by Jerusalem Post and Kan News.
• Kidnappings and secret prison abuses under a vacuum of state authority, according to Human Rights Watch (2023).

Other internationally criminalized issues were similarly neglected or met with minimal coverage, resulting in a lost narrative battle against adversaries and a squandered opportunity to reinforce state legitimacy and justify security operations domestically and internationally.

Fourth: Neglect of the Digital Space and Absence of a National Platform

While dozens of local pages and regional satellite channels advocating separatist rhetoric proliferated, a responsive national digital platform that broadcasts official statements in real-time, counters rumors, and publishes video reports from the heart of events was conspicuously absent.

The state failed to launch an updated official website dedicated to Sweida or activate communication channels with the local community (WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook) to receive reports, complaints, and correct misinformation.

In comparable international cases—such as Spain during the 2017 Catalonia referendum and Turkey amid the 2016 coup attempt—the vital role of official digital platforms in swiftly countering fake news and safeguarding national unity was clearly demonstrated.

In the Syrian context, Sweida's citizens remained vulnerable to exaggeration, propaganda, and incitement in the absence of a trusted national source.

Fifth: Ignoring Economic and Political Crimes as Sovereign Ammunition

One of the biggest missed opportunities by the official media concerns the failure to expose and leverage serious economic and political crimes, including:

• The Captagon trade and drug trafficking that have transformed Sweida into a major transit hub, as documented extensively by international reports (The Guardian, Reuters, Syria Direct).
• Espionage activities with Israel and neighboring states through secret meetings and logistical support for certain local factions, as revealed by Israeli and international media sources.
• The recruitment of children and underage women for combat roles, guard duties, espionage, and smuggling operations—a blatant violation of international conventions, according to reports by Human Rights Watch and UNICEF.
• The public display of flags belonging to an occupying state (Israel) and separatist banners in squares and demonstrations, constituting a direct breach of state sovereignty and a legal and constitutional crime.
• Documented massacres and mass killings targeting civilians or opponents of the separatist factions, as monitored by international and human rights organizations.
• Kidnappings and economic extortion aimed at civilians opposing separatism, used to finance armed factions and impose control through fear.
• The operation of secret prisons and unlawful detentions, where individuals have been held and tortured in religious compounds or private homes beyond judicial oversight, as corroborated by local testimonies and rights groups.
• Sabotage of public and private facilities and attacks on infrastructure as pressure or retaliation tactics, exacerbating civilian suffering and destabilizing local security.
• Arms and ammunition smuggling across borders and the formation of cross-governorate criminal networks.

These and many other crimes and violations, systematically ignored or poorly documented and exploited by official Syrian media, were sufficient grounds to justify decisive sovereign or security measures, and to empower the state's legal response at the United Nations Security Council and international courts—thereby undermining separatist narratives and countering opposing propaganda.

Yet, as is typical, Syrian state media treated these grave crimes as peripheral issues: they neither exposed them nor called for international cooperation or sanctions against external backers of the factions.

Sixth: Absence of a Strategy to Engage the Local Community in Sweida

Syrian media demonstrated a severe deficiency in addressing the local environment of Sweida. No programs were produced in the local dialect, nor were social or tribal figures loyal to the state—who had fallen victim to unlawful militia actions—given a platform to speak. The militia's behavior was portrayed as isolated acts rather than reactions to systematic kidnappings and displacement.

No space was allocated to debunk separatist claims in a straightforward, realistic manner that respects the Druze community's unique identity and local history. It became apparent that the Damascus government's communication resembled addressing a community detached from reality, recycling the old official rhetoric while naively expecting different results.

Meanwhile, on the ground, the streets of Sweida were daily subjected to separatist propaganda and slogans advocating for a "Mountain State" or "International Protection," without anyone effectively responding or clarifying the state's position.

Seventh: Failure to Address the International Community and Leverage Global Instruments

Official Syrian media failed to engage international organizations and human rights bodies with documented legal messaging, neglecting to capitalize on the principles of state sovereignty and legitimacy to combat rebellion as other countries have done.

Unlike Spain during the Catalonia crisis or Turkey following the 2016 coup attempt—where governments actively communicated legal justifications to international bodies—Syrian media did not adopt this approach to affirm state legitimacy and counter separatist discourse.

It was entirely absent from international press conferences, leaving the field open for separatist narratives, supported by Western and Israeli sources, to present themselves as civil rights movements rather than organized dismantling projects.

Coordination Failure and Leadership Vacuum… A Future Open to Chaos

The Sweida crisis exposed a critical structural flaw within the so-called "Sharia government," marked by a lack of coordination among the four pillars of power: executive, judicial, legislative, and media.

At every crisis juncture, each entity acted independently—media did not ground itself in law, the judiciary did not back actions with formal complaints, and executive leadership failed to provide factual information to the public or the international community.

This collective confusion and inertia foreshadow further failures in upcoming dossiers. A government claiming Islamic legitimacy yet ignoring the foundations of responsible and principled media, and squandering every sovereign tool at its disposal, can only be expected to incur greater losses both domestically and internationally.

The absence of unified media leadership at this critical moment poses the gravest threat to Syria's unity and stability in both the short and long term.

References:

1.Balanche, Fabrice. "The Druze of Suwayda: A Strategic Pivot." The Washington Institute,

2023.

2.INSS. "Annual Report 2019: Syrian Druze and Israel." Institute for National Security Studies, 2019.

3.Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. "Druze Dynamics on Syria's Southern Front," 2021.

4.Syrian Penal Code No. 148/1949, Articles 275, 285, 286.

5.Haaretz. "IDF Treating Syrian Rebels." 2023.

6.Kan News. "Druze Leaders Seek Israeli Protection." 2023.

7.The Guardian. "Syria's southern drug corridor," 20 Dec 2022.

8.Reuters. "Captagon Smuggling in Syria," 2022.

9.Human Rights Watch. "Syria: Detention and Torture in Sweida." 2023.

10.NATO Review. "Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and 'Trust' as the Antidote," Nov 2021.

11.Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. 1991.

12.Turkey Penal Code Article 301.

13.Spain Penal Code on Separatist Symbols.

14.Syria Direct. "Captagon smuggling and the Druze militia," Jan 2023.

15.Carnegie Middle East Center. "Strategic Margins: The Druze of Suwayda," 2019.

16.Chatham House. "Syria's Southern Provinces and Regional Tensions," 2024.

17.Krasner, S. D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton University Press, 1999.

18.Syrian Penal Code No. 148/1949.